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ABSTRACT

Security protocol based on random key generation for an RFID system
by
Karthik Raghavan
Dr. Y oohwan Kim, Exam ination Comm ittee Chair
A ssistant Professor o f C om puter Science
U niversity o f N evada, Las Vegas

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology, which describes the
transm ission of unique inform ation by a w ireless device, over Radio waves, when
prom pted or read by a com patible reader.
The basic com ponents in im plem enting RFID are RFID tags which are small
m icrochips attached to a radio antenna, m ounted on a substrate, and a wireless
transceiver/reader that queries the RFID tags.
This thesis deals with research issues related to security aspects in the
com munication between an RFID tag and its reader. M ore precisely, it deals with a new,
simple and efficient security protocol based on an encryption that uses the concept of
regular public key regeneration, which can be effortlessly adopted in an RFID
application.

in
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
R adio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an Automatic Identification method that
works by storing and retrieving data remotely, using simple transponder devices [1]. A
typical R F ID system consists of a low -pow er transponder chip, called the RFID Tag that
stores the identification data, a Radio Frequency Reader that can receive and transmit data
using Radio Frequency waves, and a Backend application that stores all the data needed
by the system which can validate the tag as being a legitimate one. RFID technology is
finding wide-scale use these days, in various applications basically for the reason that it is
easy to im plem ent and is of relatively low cost.
An RFID tag is an object that can be attached to, or incorporated into a product,
animal, or person for the purpose of identification using radio waves. Chip-based RFID
tags contain silicon chips and antennas. Passive tags require no internal power source,
whereas active tags require a pow er source [1], Apart from being classified based on their
pow er source, RFID tags are also classified into different classes, based on thenfunctional characteristics. The RFID Class Structure classifies tags as belonging to one of
five classes: Class I (Identity Tags), Class 2 (Higher Functionality Tags), Class 3 (SemiPassive Tags), Class 4 (Active Ad Hoc Tags), or Class 5 (Reader Tags) [2], The
following figure shows the inlay of a passive RFID tag:
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Figure 1 An RFID Tag that is being used in applications today. Inlay of Texas
Instrum ents' I4m m X 14m m HF Tag [3]

An RFID reader is a device that is used to interrogate an RFID tag. The reader has
an antenna that emits radio waves; the tag responds by sending back its data. A number
of factors can affect the distance at which a tag can be read (the read range). The
frequency used for identification, the antenna gain, the orientation and polarization of the
reader antenna and the transponder antenna, as well as the placem ent o f the tag on the
object to be identified will all have an im pact on the RFID system ’s read range [4].

2. a

2. b

2. c

Figure 2.a High-Frequency R eader [5]; Figure 2.b Ultra-High Frequency EPC Reader [5];
Figure 2.c H igh-Frequency Handheld R eader [5]
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The backend application is a high-end com puter or a server that m anages the data
required for the application that is using the RFID system. Typically, it could be a
database interfaced w ith application-specific functions. It also defines the business logic
for interpreting raw RFID data and the actions associated with it. For this reason, the
backend application can never go down and it's connectivity with the readers should be
m aintained and standardized, always.

1.1 H istory of RFID
In 1946 Léon Therem in invented an espionage tool for the Soviet governm ent
which retransm itted incident radio waves w ith audio information. Even though this
device was a passive covert listening device, not an identification tag, it has been
attributed as the first know n device and a predecessor to RFID technology. A more
similar technology, the IFF transponder, was invented by the British in 1939, and was
routinely used by the allies in W orld W ar II to identify airplanes as friend or foe [1]. In
1950, RFID was experim ented on with all the explorations that went on for m ore than a
decade. The 1990s saw com m ercial RFID applications enter m ainstream and standards
being prescribed. Today, it’s being widely used and the RFID explosion still continues

[6].

1.2 How it works
In a typical system , tags are attached to objects. Each tag has a certain am ount of
internal m em ory (EEPRO M ) in which it stores inform ation about the object, such as its
unique ED (serial) num ber. W hen these tags pass through a field generated by a reader.
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they transm it this inform ation back to the reader, thereby identifying the object. The
com m unication process between the reader and tag is m anaged and controlled by one of
several protocols, such as the ISO 15693 and ISO 18000. Basically what happens is that
when the reader is switched on, it starts em itting a signal at the selected frequency band.
Any corresponding tag in the vicinity o f the reader will detect the signal and use the
energy from it to wake up and supply operating pow er to its internal circuits. Once the
Tag has decoded the signal as valid, it replies to the reader, and indicates its presence by
m odulating (affecting) the reader field [5].

RFID T ag

RF Antenna
\

3

Host Computer
Scannef

or Reader
Figure 3 RFID System [5]

If m ore than one valid tag is present then all those tags will respond at the same
time, which causes a signal collision at the reader end and is seen as an indication of
m ultiple tags. The reader m anages this problem by using an anti-collision algorithm
designed to allow tags to be sorted and individually selected. There are many different
types o f algorithm s (Binary Tree, Aloha, etc.) which are defined as part o f the protocol
standards. Once the appropriate tag is selected, the reader is then allowed to perform
various operations like read or a read/ write operation [5].
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The following table describes the various properties of an RFID system for different
frequency ranges that it can operate in [5]:
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Figure 4 RFID system properties for different operating frequencies

1.3 Security Issues in RFID systems
A lthough RFID

system s m ay em erge as the m ost pervasive com puting

technologies, there are still some security issues related to it that need to be addressed. As
the applications of RFID keep grow ing in com plexity and see w ider use, the need for
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updated security m easures that are rugged but still suit the simple working standards of
RFID is also abounding.
One o f the m ajor issues related to RFID security is privacy. Tags reveal sensitive
data when queried by readers and they do it indiscrim inately [7]. A ny perpetrator who
wants to access classified data can do so, by querying the tag, the w ay it is supposed to
be. The other m ost im portant security issue in using RFID is tracking. The tags usually
allow a third party to easily establish an association between a given tag and its holder or
owner, by revealing the location to any reader that queries it [7]. Apart from these issues,
an RFID system is always vulnerable to attacks like Spoofing, Denial o f Service,
Eavesdropping, Counterfeiting and Physical attacks.
There has been extensive research carried out in the field o f RFID security, since
RFID technology’s invasion into every other field is beckoning, and a standardized
security protocol for RFID systems is a possibility in the near future. This thesis aims at
providing an efficient solution to the security issues of an RFID system, that have been
addressed later on.
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CHAPTER 2

REID SECU RITY LITERATURE REVIEW
Since its invention in the 1940s, REID has been an obvious target for abuse.
W ireless identification is a powerful capability, and RFID reveals both a physical
object’s nature and location. A nyone can easily gain unauthorized access to RFID data
because they don’t need a line o f sight to gather it. For example, in the original RFIDbased application— Identification Friend or Foe (IFE) systems— security breaches
resulted in A llied planes being shot down [8].
D espite concerns over security issues, because of its simplicity, low -cost and
uniquely identifying capability, RFID systems are scaled with additional im plem entation
to make it more suitable to use for a particular application and are achieving wide-scale
deployment. There has always been a call for a consensus on a secure RFID
com m unication protocol that w ould standardize all the security measures o f a low-cost
RFID

system. H owever, with each passing day, the applications of RFID are

trem endously growing only to put forth the question o f the efficiency o f existing security
protocols when im plem ented in the new and more sophisticated applications. This
stresses the need for constant extensive research to find an appropriate solution, to secure
the RFID applications.
This chapter discusses the security issues in the predom inant applications that use
RFID, and also the research and concepts that try to resolve these issues. As mentioned.
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the earliest application of RFID was in W orld W ar II when it was used for the
Identification Friend or Foe systems, w hich were compromised.

2.1 RFID Application Study
RFID has been quite extensively used in Inventory m anagem ent. Livestock
tracking. Autom obile tracking. A irport Security, IDs and badges, etc.
The m ost com mon application o f RFID in Inventory m anagem ents w ould be its
replacem ent o f barcodes to handle product and custom er inform ation and stocking and
w arehousing purposes. W al-m art was the first retailer to start using RFID in place of
barcode, in 2006. But early efforts to use RFID technology for inventory m anagem ent
have raised concerns that tags will he used to develop consum er profiles. Civil-liberties
advocates similarly fear that RFID technology m ay he used by the governm ent to m onitor
people [9].
RFID is used in by a gamut o f applications for tracking purposes. They are used
in livestock farm ing where each animal has its own tag so that it can be tracked
individually. [10] talks about how the US D epartm ent of Agriculture is planning to use
RFID to uniquely identify every cow in the US, to step up efforts to track anim al diseases
more efficiently. It is used the same way in tracking cars in parking lots and in rental car
lots. [ I I , 12, 13, 14] explain how RFID tags can be used to not m anage access control in
parking lots, but also to track stolen cars and high end parts of a car, not to m ention the
possibility of adding a tag to the license plate to facilitate the police or anyone concerned,
to retrieve any relevant data about the vehicle.
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The use of RFID tags can aid the detection and identification of possible threats in
a diverse range of applications from passenger check-in at airports to the detection of
intruders. [15] investigates an automatic tracking system to im prove airport efficiency
and security by means of a cellular netw ork of passive RFID devices, which may be
issued along within the boarding passes or as security badges.

2.2 RFID Security Issues
It is obvious that in the applications m entioned above and in the other applications
o f RFID, privacy and data integrity are highly essential, as they deal with sensitive and
classified data that could be w orth a fortune to an adversary. H ence, there have been
several security m easure and protocols that have been proposed over the years, to protect
an RFID application from any of the possible attacks.
RFID security threats have been broadly classified into five categories and have
been describes, as follows, in [8]:
2.2.1 Sniffing
RFID tags are indiscrim inate— they’re designed to be readable by any com pliant
reader. Unfortunately, this lets unauthorized readers scan tagged items unbeknow nst to
the bearer, often from great distances. People can also collect RFID data by
eavesdropping on the wireless RFID channel. U nrestricted access to tag data can have
serious im plications.
2.2.2 Tracking
RFID technology facilitates clandestine m onitoring o f individuals’ whereabouts
and actions. RFID readers placed in strategic locations (such as doorways) can record
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RFID tags’ unique responses, which can then be persistently associated with a person’s
identity. RFID tags without unique identifiers can also facilitate tracking by forming
constellations, recurring groups o f tags that are associated with an individual. RFID
technology also enables m onitoring entire groups of people.
2.2.3 Spoofing
Attackers can mimic authentic RFID tags by writing appropriately form atted data
on blank RFID tags. For example, thieves could retag items in a superm arket identifying
them as similar, but cheaper, products. Tag cloning is another kind of spoofing attack,
which produces unauthorized copies of legitim ate RFID tags.
2.2.4 Replay attacks
R elay devices can intercept and retransm it RFID queries, which offenders can use
to abuse various RFID applications. F ngland’s new RFID-enabled license plates, ePlates, are one exam ple o f a m odem RFID system th at’s susceptible to attack by a relay
device. The active e-Plate tags contain an encrypted ID code that is stored in the UK
M inistry of T ransport’s vehicle database. An attacker can record the encrypted identifier
when another car’s license plate is scanned and replay it later.
2.2.5 D enial o f service
RFID system s only w ork when RFID tags and back-end databases are available.
Thieves can exploit this to steal R FID -tagged items by rem oving tags from the items
com pletely or by putting them in a foil lined booster bag (Faraday cage) that blocks RFID
readers’ query signals and tem porarily deactivates the items. A nother attack takes the
opposite approach— flood an RFID system w ith m ore data than it can handle. Anti-RFID

10
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activists could rem ove RFID tags and plant them on other items, causing RFID systems
to record useless data, discrediting and devaluing RFID technology.

2.3 Existing Security M echanism s and Protocols
Low cost Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are highly resource limited,
and cannot support strong cryptography. There has been constant research on finding a
light-w eight protocol that can handle these issues as efficiently as possible. The most
common approaches involve a Challenge-Response System[16]

with or without

encryption/hash technique.
2.3.1 C hallenge-Response System
[16] suggests a feasible security m echanism to enhance RFID ta g ’s security, but
conform ing to the low cost budget. It uses m utual authentication betw een reader and
RFID tag that is based upon the principle o f three-pass mutual authentication in
accordance w ith ISO 9798-2, in which both entities in the com m unication verify the other
participant’s know ledge of a secret cryptographic key. In the procedure of mutual
authentication, all the RFID tags and readers that belong to the same application share the
same secret cryptographic key K ab- W hen a RFID tag first enters the interrogation
zone of a reader both parties will corroborate their identities to each other using threepass m utual authentication. The illustration of the mutual authentication procedure
between RFID tag and reader is shown in Figure I .
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Figure 5 Illustration of m utual three-pass authentication procedure between RFID tag and
reader

A nother research paper [17], suggests a sim ilar type o f Challenge-Response
System, in which the reader chooses a challenge, x, which is a random num ber and
transm its it to the tag. The tag com putes x = ek( y) and transm its the value y to the reader
(here e is the encryption rule that is publicly known and K is a secret key known only to
the reader and the particular tag). The reader then com putes y ' = e k ( x ). Then the reader
verifies that y' = y.
2.3.2 Encryption
Encrypting the data that is transm itted is a sim ple idea o f ensuring data privacy
and providing data integrity. B ut incorporating even a simple encryption algorithm in an
RFID system requires a hardw are im plem entation th at’s resource intrinsic. TEA is an
encryption algorithm designed for simplicity and ease o f im plem entation and is
recom m ended for RFID applications by [17]. The encryption algorithm is based on the
Feistel cipher [18] and a large num ber of iterations to gain security without
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com prom ising simplicity. A description of the algorithm is provided in [19]. A hardware
im plem entation of the algorithm is stated to have the same com plexity as DES [19].
Im plem enting any o f the available com plex encryption algorithm s is going to be
an overhead on the system. Typically, a tag can only store hundreds of bits, roughly have
between 5000 and 10000 logic gates, and a m axim um com m unication range of a few
meters. W ithin this gate counting, only betw een 250 and 3000 gates can be devoted to
security functions. It is interesting to recall that for a standard im plem entation of the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or any other relatively com plex encryption
algorithm, between 20000 and 30000 gates are needed, not to mention the pow er
restrictions [7].
2.3.3 H ash Function
H ash functions have been proposed as a replacem ent to encryption. One of the
simple proposals described a Hash Lock m echanism [20]. According to the Hash Lock
m echanism, the tag is locked during the m anufacturing process and it is given a value (or
meta-ID) y, and it is only unlocked from the individual by presentation of a key or PIN
value X such that y = h(x) for a standard one-w ay hash function h. [21] explains
Random ized hash-lock and Hash Chain m echanism s which are also common. Other
com plex hash functions like SH A -I have also been considered, but as m entioned they
dem and a tight high-end hardware configuration.
2.3.4 Sim ple Approaches
A nother research paper by Zongw ei Luo, Terry Chan and Jenny S. Li [18]
discusses different simpler approaches to a Lightw eight M utual Authentication Protocol.
The proposed approaches in [20] are briefed below;
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Extra D evice A dded A pproach - An additional device operated along with the tags and
readers, to prevent attacks using Faraday Cage, Blocker Tag or Active Jamming.
Radio Frequency M odification Approach - Readers and special tags can em ploy random
frequencies for transm ission so that unauthorized users may not access the data. This also
helps in preventing collision when m ultiple tags are being used.
O ther Approach - These include m ethods like killing the tag, which makes the tag truly
dead, and can never be reactivated, to prevent tracking and by using a Hash Lock.
A lot of security protocols that use variations of the above m entioned security
mechanisms, have been proposed but with RFID growing trem endously in application,
these protocols don’t prove to be com pletely fool-proof or resource-friendly.
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CH APTER 3

SECURITY PRO TO C O L D EFIN ITIO N AND IM PLEM EN TA TIO N
The working of a security protocol has to be precisely defined, in order to analyze
its perform ance, especially when it is used w ith a relatively less com plex and a low-cost
application, like an RFID system. This Chapter describes how the proposed security
protocol is defined and im plem ented, and details its working. This is a proposed
theoretical solution to the security issues involved in an RFID system, the efficiency of
which was evaluated and is elucidated on, in the next Chapter.
The proposed Security protocol guarantees data privacy and authentication
between the Tag and the reader, to the m axim um extent possible. It uses simple
inform ation exchange betw een the Tag and the Reader, to authenticate each other. The
existing security protocols use simple encryption or an efficient hashing technique to
authenticate the Tag and the Reader. Though the proposed protocol also uses encryption,
it makes the RFID system foolproof in alm ost every w ay that the other protocols miss out
on. This does increase the cost and load on the tags, but will prove to be highly secure for
a system that needs it.
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3.1 W hy does RFID Com m unication need Security?
W ith

a

technology

as

ubiquitous

as

radio-frequency

identification,

the

applications using it ju st keep growing by the day. Som e of the current applications that
use the RFID technology are:
•

Inventory Control and M anagem ent
Container/ Pallet/ Shipm ent Tracking
ID Badges and Access Control
A utom atic Toll Control
A irport Security
Equipm ent/ Personnel tracking in Hospitals
Parking Lots/ Rental Car Lots
The data exchanged in these applications, and the various others, that use RFID,

are quite sensitive and need to be protected, in order to avoid identity theft, data loss,
data/ product duplication, etc. Com prom ised RFID system s can be used to the will of the
hacker, to reproduce/ m odify/ m isuse the system. The Interceptor can reproduce tags, by
monitoring the Tag ID exchange and can, with calculated attacks, fool the reader and the
database, in giving any inform ation he needs. A com prom ised RFID system can hence,
cause a huge monetary, com m ercial or personal loss. W ith a lot of m ilitary applications
using RFID these days, security o f RFID data exchange between the Tag and the reader,
is of utm ost im portance. Security breaches can happen at the RFID tag, network, or data
level. Part o f the problem with adopting existing standards, at least at one level, m ay be
the extreme low cost and extremely light functionality on the tags. All o f the good
security tools developed over the last 20 years w on't fit into the hardware that's available
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on m ost of these RFID tags. Even encryption chews up m ost of the processing pow er of
the Tag. Therefore, a security protocol that uses minimal resources and yet is efficient in
authenticating the Tag and the Reader, for each other, is absolutely necessary.

3.2 Custom RFID System D escription
3.2.1 RFID Reader
The Reader required for the proposed protocol, needs to be highly flexible. The
protocol requires a reader that can read, as well as write, to the tag. The frequency, which
the reader has to read from, is decided based on the application. A high-frequency reader
that can read and write is appropriate in testing the proposed security protocol. The reader
needs to support Frequency H opping - Code D ivision M ultiple Access (FH - CDM A)
and should have circuitry for m odulation and dem odulation, at low, high, ultra-high or
microwave frequencies, w hichever is prescribed for the application. The reader should
also be capable of transm itting to m ore than one channel. This is an overhead on the
pow er consumed, but the system can still be optim ized by using an appropriate m ulti
channel RF transm itter chip to get the desired results.
Texas

Instruments

In c.’s

product.

M ulti-standard

H igh

frequency

RFID

Reader/W riter IC, TRF7960 is a suggested reader, for any application that uses the
security protocol based on random key generation. The specifications of TRF7960
include Completely Integrated Protocol handling (OSI M odel Layer 3 and below).
Separate internal high-PSRR pow er supplies. Dual receiver input with AM and PM
dem odulation, Reader-to-reader anti-collision, wide operating voltage range 2.7V to 5.5V
and Ultra-low power m odes[22]. The TRF7690, however, is not a multi-channel RF
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transm itter, but this can be fixed by using such a transm itter chip, like Texas Instruments
In c.’s H ighly Integrated M ulti-channel R F Transm itter for Low -pow er wireless
applications, CC1150[23]. The TRF7690 describes the design o f a basic RFID reader that
w ould suit the proposed protocol. The internal circuitry of TRF7690 is shown below [24]:

Antenna and
^4(llch^nQ CIrcull

Sunu6ùnd PiWùùùi
IndtcmiorLEOs

RFID inwfate 0%
Size ol a Quarter

U SB lnt«if@ee

Figure 6 Basic RFID reader (TRF7690) Internal Hardware D esign

3.2.2 RFID Tag
The RFID Tag required for the security protocol based on random key generation,
is custom ized to suit the protocol and is not available in the market. H ence, this protocol
m ay not w ork with any of the current RFID tags that are available. H ow ever, the only
custom ization w ould involve the Read-only registers and the Re-w ritable memory. The
basic configuration and the chip configuration could resemble Texas Instrum ents Inc.’s
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Single-Chip, Low-power, Low -cost CM OS FSK/GFSK/ASK/OOK R F Transm itter for
Narrowband and m ulti-band Apps, CC1070 [25], which are being m arketed for RFID
tags.
The RFID Tag needs to support m ulti-channel transm ission and frequency
modulation. The proposed m easure o f sophistication can never be im posed on a passive
tag that does not have a pow er source of its own. H ence, this protocol can only be used
with active tags and high-end applications that w ould justify the cost of using these tags,
which eventually will prove to be cheaper than any other technology used in its place.
The internal circuit diagram o f the basic RFID Tag, CC1070, that can be modified, so as
to be used with this protocol, is shown below [26]:
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Figure 7 Basic RFID Tag internal C ircuit diagram
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The proposed protocol requires the Tag to have three basic registers that hold the
data used to identify the tag uniquely, apart from the other registers that are needed for
interm ediate com putation, like while encrypting and decrypting data. It is im perative to
describe these m em ory units because they define the working of the proposed security
protocol in a big way.
3.2.3 RFID Tag M em ory Description
The RFID Tag has a 128-bit R O M that stores the 128 bit Tag ID. Since the Tag
ID associated with a particular Tag cannot be changed, it is written to a Read-O nly
M emory even when it is manufactured. This value, which uniquely identifies the tag, can
only be read and can never be modified.
The tag also has two 64 B it R e-w ritable memories, which are used to store
im portant data that can be read and modified. One o f the 64 Bit Re-writable memories
(RAM) stores the 64 Bit Encryption Key, w hich is a public key shared between the tag
and the reader, that is, the backend application, and can be over-written. The other 64 Bit
Re-writable m em ory is used to store a 64 B it Authentication Code, w hich is used to
authenticate the reader and can be over-written. The following is a schematic
representation of the m em ory structures, needed in the RFID tag, for the proposed
security protocol:
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RFID T a g ’s M ainM eitio ry S tr u c tu r e fiir S e c u rity protocol b a se d o«
R andom K e y G eneration

128 B it Tag ID

(ROM )

64 MSB

64 B it Encryption Key

64 LSB

(RAM)

P u b lic Key

64 B it A uthenticaition Code (RAM)
M eta ID

Figure 8 M em ory Structure D escription of the required RFID tag

3.2.4 RFID System ’s B ackend Application
The Backend Application holds the data about all the legitim ate RFID tags that
are a part o f the RFID application. The Backend application could be any application,
running on a (remote) server. D atabase M anagem ent System or ju st a D ata dump. The
backend application needs to be connected to the reader at all tim es and the connectivity
and integrity o f this link, plays a crucial role in the performance of the RFID application.
As m entioned, the backend application holds the data about the valid tags that are a part
of the application. In a system, with the proposed security protocol being im plemented,
the backend application stores inform ation which includes the 128-bit Tag ID, 64-bit
Encryption K ey and 64-bit A uthentication Code of every legitim ate RFID tag. The value
for the tag ID cannot be m odified but, the values of the Encryption key and the
Authentication Code, associated with a particular Tag ID can be modified. The backend
application also takes care of any data processing, like encryption/ decryption, generating
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a new random encryption key, generating a new random authentication code, etc., thus
abstracting the reader from any m anipulation with the data.
The reader can com m unicate w ith the backend application, using any of the basic
netw ork protocols like TCP/IP, SSL, SOAP, etc. or could use a m iddlew are that manages
the com m unication in a secure way. A n RFID M iddleware is softw are that manages the
flow of data betw een tag readers and backend enterprise applications and is responsible
for the quality, and therefore usability, o f the inform ation [27]. A high level of security
can be incorporated in the m iddlew are that has the capability o f routing data to more than
one standardized server. The backend application should be able to provide valid data, in
the appropriate form, to the reader, at anytim e when it is requested for.

3.3 RFID Security Im plem entation based on Protocol
The EPC and ISO have standardized the first two layers o f the com munication
protocol stack between the readers and the tags. These two layers include the local
wireless com m unication that occurs betw een a reader and the tags w ithin its read field.
The first layer standard is the physical, w hich describes the specific radio frequencies and
whether tags and readers are com m unicating in half or full duplex mode. The second
layer, referred to as the data link layer, has been standardized based on a slotted Aloha
scheme [28].
The physical (PHY) layer standard functionality defines how the reader
com municates with the tag and how the tag com m unicates with the reader using passive
com munication. The physical layer features include the signaling, m odulation and
encoding of symbols. The physical layer m ust be amenable to long range passive
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com munications. The data link (DATA) layer form s the base logic layer of the class
structure, which provides a fram ework to classify RFID tags according to their prim ary
functional characteristics. The data link layer standard defines how com m unications are
logically grouped, or packetized, the com mands that the reader may issue to the tag, the
tag ’s response to any com m ands, when and how a tag may initiate com m unication or
functionality w ithout being com m anded by the reader, and the resource discovery, i.e.,
tag identification, algorithm [2].
The proposed Security protocol makes sure that its im plem entation secures RFID
com m unication, in both the layers o f the RFID com m unication protocol suite. The
Physical Layer, which deals with the actual w ireless data com munication, uses Frequency
H opping and the D ata Link Layer uses D ata Encryption, according to the proposed
protocol. The following figure describes the security im plem entation in the tw o layers of
the RFID com m unication protocols suite:

M U D

C’ o i m n i i i u c a t i o n P r o t o c o l S u i t e w i t l i S e c x u i t y D u p l e i u e i i t m t i o u

Ditto. Link Layer (DA TA}

D a ta E u c iy p tio ii

Physiccil Le^er (PHY)
F r e q u e n c y H o p p in g - C D A IA

Figure 9 Security in the different layers o f RFID com m unication protocol suite
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3.3.1 Security Im plem entation in Physical Layer
The frequency range, in which the RFID application operates, is divided into
bands or frequency channels. This type of com munication betw een a tag and the reader,
using Frequency M odulation, is pretty com m on [28] and is usually used when there are
m ultiple tags, to avoid collision w hile reading [20]. The RFID reader and the tag use one
particular channel to transm it or receive the legitim ate data and send dum m y data through
the other channels. The dum m y data could be anything that is in the same form at of the
original data but does not affect the RFID system ’s working in any way. The frequency,
at which valid data is transm itted, keeps changing for every transm ission, by both the tag
and the reader. This frequency switching is called Frequency H opping and this type of
access m ethod is called Frequency H opping - Code Division M ultiple Access [29]. [30,
31] define how Frequency H opping is already being used in RFID systems. It is for this
reason that the tag and the reader are chosen such that they are able to transm it to
m ultiple channels.
T he sequence o f frequency hops is known both to the reader (Backend
application) and the tag, so that legitim ate data can be read from the appropriate
frequency. This concept is sim ilar to w hat is used by Bluetooth Technology [32], except
for the fact that B luetooth uses Frequency Hopping to ensure proper com munication, as it
permits connectivity to m ultiple B luetooth enabled devices, and the proposed RFID
system uses Frequency H opping to make Eavesdropping or any other attack on the
Physical layer, as non-feasible as possible.
Frequency H opping can be used with Low-frequencies, H igh-frequencies, Ultrahigh Frequencies and M icrow ave frequencies. Therefore the RFID application can
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choose to w ork in any frequency range, based on its requirements, and yet have the
proposed security im plem entation in its Physical Layer.
3.3.2 Security Im plem entation in D ata Link Layer
The D ata Link Layer decides in w hat form at and how exactly data is exchanged
between the tag and the reader. Security im plem entation in this layer is im perative and
the proposed protocol, like a lot of existing security protocols for RFID systems, uses
data encryption. D ata encryption guarantees a high level of data integrity and makes the
data com prehendible only by the RFID application using it.
Since encrypting and decrypting of data, places a lot of com plications on the
system, like pow er consum ption, m emory resources, processing time, etc., the proposed
protocol cannot be im plem ented in a RFID system that uses passive tags, tags that don’t
have a pow er source o f their own. Hence, this protocol can be used only with a m ore
complex system that can support its implem entation. The type of encryption is chosen
after careful consideration of a lot of factors that decide the perform ance measures o f the
RFID system.
A relatively less sophisticated system or a system that has its physical layer
com pletely secure from any sort of interception, can afford a sim ple encryption algorithm
and if the application requires a high level of data privacy and integrity, a rugged
encryption algorithm could be used. The type o f encryption is always a trade-off and
should be chosen prudently, so as to make the system as efficient as possible, without
im pacting the perform ance of the RFID system.
The security protocol based on Random key generation, as proposed in this thesis,
was tested with three different Encryption methods, namely. Boolean encryption. Tiny
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Encryption A lgorithm and A dvanced Encryption Standards. These three encryption
algorithms were chosen because they differ in the com plexity o f im plem entation, their
efficiency and im m unity to attacks, the B oolean encryption being the sim plest algorithm
and the AES being the most efficient of the three. These three encryption methods are
described in detail as follows:
3.3.2.1 Boolean Encryption
Boolean encryption, as used in this im plem entation of the security protocol based
on Random key generation, is a sim ple Binary XOR operation. The encryption is a
simple process o f com puting the value o f the binary value of plaintext that needs to be
encrypted, X O R ed with the binary value o f a public key. [21, 33, 34] proposes a security
model that introduces a challenge-response m echanism which uses no cryptographic
prim itices other than simple XORs. The binary X O R operation (also know n as the binary
XOR function) will always produce a 1 output if either of its inputs is 1 and will produce
a 0 output if both o f its inputs are 0 or 1. To decrypt the encrypted value, using Binary
XOR operation, the binary value of the encrypted value is X O Red w ith the binary value
of the same shared public key that was used in encrypting the plaintext. This type of
encryption requires no more pow er than a system that uses no encryption, but can be
easily cracked. This serves to ju st abstract the actual data instead of m aking it com pletely
secure.
3.3.2.2 Tiny Encryption Algorithm
The Tiny Encryption A lgorithm (TEA) is a block cipher notable for its simplicity
o f description and im plem entation (typically a few lines of code). It was designed by
D avid W heeler and Roger N eedham o f the Cam bridge Com puter Laboratory, and first
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presented at the Fast Software Encryption w orkshop in 1994 (W heeler and Needham ,
1994).
TEA operates on 64-bit blocks and uses- a 128-bit key. It has a Feistel structure
with a suggested 64 rounds, typically im plem ented in pairs term ed cycles. It has an
extremely simple key schedule, m ixing all of the key material in exactly the same w ay for
each cycle [35].
Routine, written in the C language, for encoding with key k[0] - k[3]. D ata in v[0]
and v[I]: [19]
void code(long* v, long* k) {
unsigned long y= v[0],z=v[I], sum=0, /* set up */
delta=0x9e3779b9, /* a key schedule constant */
n=32 ;
while (n—>0) { /* basic cycle start */
sum += delta ;
y 4-= ((z« 4 )4 -k [0 ]) ^ (z+sum ) ^ ((z » 5 )4 -k [I]) ;
z += ((y « 4 )+ k [2 ]) ^ (y4-sum) ^ ((y » 5 )+ k [3 ]) ;
} /* end cycle */
v[0]=y ; v[I]= z ; }
The following diagram describes how TEA works [33]:
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Figure 10 TEA encryption flow chart

This type of algorithm can replace DES in software, and is short enough to write
into alm ost any program on any com puter and on one im plem entation it is three tim es as
fast as a good software im plem entation of DES which has 16 rounds [19]. The only
attack that is possible is a B rute-force attack. The Tiny Encryption A lgorithm was chosen
because it is as good as DES, but is a lot faster and very easily im plem ented in a system
that’s as simple as an RFID system. TEA has a few weaknesses. M ost notably, it suffers
from equivalent keys - each key is equivalent to three others, and this means that the
effective key size is only 126 bits. TEA is also susceptible to a related-key attack which
requires i P chosen plaintexts under a related-key pair, with 2^^ time com plexity [35].
3.3.2.3 A dvanced Encryption Standard (AES)
The A dvanced Encryption Standard (AES), also know n as Rijndael, is a block
cipher adopted as an encryption standard by the U.S. government. The AES is the
successor of DES [36]. The cipher was developed by tw o Belgian cryptographers, Joan
D aem en and V incent Rijmen.
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AES has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits.
M ost of AES calculations are done in a special finite field. AES operates on a 4x4 array
of bytes, term ed the state (versions of Rijndael with a larger block size have additional
columns in the state) [37]. For encryption, each round of AES (except the last round)
consists o f four stages:
1.

AddRoundKey — each byte o f the state is com bined with the round key; each

round key is derived from the cipher key using a key schedule.
2.

SubBytes — a non-linear substitution step where each byte is replaced with

another according to a lookup table.
3.

ShiftRows — a transposition step w here each row of the state is shifted cyclically

a certain num ber of steps.
4.

M ixColum ns — a mixing operation which operates on the colum ns of the state,

com bining the four bytes in each colum n using a linear transformation.
The final round replaces the M ixColum ns stage with another instance of AddRoundKey
[37].
The following is a diagramatic representation of the different stages in AES
encryption [37]:

In th e ftddE oiindK ey ste p , e a c h b:yte o tt h e sta te is co m b in ed
inith a byte of th e round su b k ey using th e XOR o p eratio n

,l';j

).

Figure 11 The A ddR oundK ey stage of AES
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AES is so secure that since June 2003, it is being used by the US Governm ent for
encrypting classified data [37]. An attack against 128-bit key AES requiring 'only' 2^^°
operations w ould be considered a break even though it would be, now, quite unfeasible.
However, im plem enting AES in an RFID system m ight be an expensive proposal and is
recom m ended only w here a high level of security is required.
3.3.3 RFID System D ata Packet Form at
The D ata packet for the proposed RFID system looks sim ilar to standard packet
format, of any other norm al RFID system. The standard data packet, as specified in Texas
Instrum ents In c.’s docum entation o f T I S6390 [38], which is used as an R F transponder,
is described below:

RFID Data Packet Form at according to TI 8 (3 9 0

S ta rt
of
F ram e

L e n g th
of
Packet

Node
A ddress

1 B yte

I B ytes

2 B ytes

D ata

C o m m an d C o m m an d
Flags

I B y t^

1 B yte

0 - 23 Bytes

B lo ck
CK eck
C K aracter
2 B ytes

Figure 15 RFID D ata Packet Form at according to TI S6360

The proposed security protocol makes use of the com m and field to hold the
Operation Bits. These O peration Bits define the type of operation being perform ed with
the data packet. The following table shows the operation corresponding to the Operation
Bits:
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Operation

Operation Bits
00

Clear contents of RAM of Tag

01

Read Request by Reader

1Û

Response by Tag

11

Write contents to RAM of Tag

Table 1 O peration Bits and the corresponding operations

The operating bits are set to 01 w henever the RFID reader is transm itting data or
requesting data to the tag. The operating bits are set to 10 w henever the tag is
transm itting data or is sending a response to an RFID reader. W hen the operating bits are
set to 11, the Reader is sending data to overwrite the data in the R A M of the tag, the 64bit Key, in particular. W hen the operating bits are set to 00, the reader is basically
sending a com m and to the tag, to erase the content of its RAM.

3.4 Protocol Implementation
The protocol im plem entation defines how the Tag and the R eader authenticate
each other, thus m aking the RFID com munication safe and authentic. The proposed
protocol, which is based on random K ey generation uses exchange of data between the
tag and the reader to m ake sure the com m unication is legitimate. The system is setup with
the devices mentioned above to facilitate com m unication according to the proposed
protocol.
The step-wise com m unication between the tag and the reader is described below:
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1. 64-Bit Random N um ber Generation
The Backend Application generates a 64-bit random number, based on any of the
distribution functions, and sends this random num ber to the reader, using any of the
protocols adopted by the RFID system. It should be noted that the type o f backend
application and the com m unication link betw een the reader and the backend application
do not affect the m easure of the security for the com m unication between the tag and the
reader, as according to the proposed protocol. B ut choosing the backend application with
a secure m iddlew are that is appropriate for the system that has the proposed protocol
im plem ented is recom m ended. The reader that received the 64-bit random num ber from
the backend application sends it to the tag, w ith the operation bits set to 01, in the form at
specified for the protocol.
2. 64-Bit A uthentication Code Encryption
The tag receives the 64-bit random num ber and uses it as a key to encrypt its 64bit Authentication Code. The type of encryption could be anything that suits the
performance and scalability of the system. The protocol was tested with all three types of
encryptions m entioned above. Once the A uthentication Code is encrypted with the 64-bit
random number, as the key, the tag then sends the encrypted Authentication Code back to
the reader, with the operation bits set to 10. The reader, in turn sends it to the backend
application, after validating the node address, w hich basically tells the reader which tag it
received the data from , when it is com m unicating with more than one tags. If the reader
does not receive a response within a specified tim e interval, the operation is tim ed out.
The proposed protocol was tested with a tim eout o f 250 nanoseconds.
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3. Encrypted Authentication Code D ecryption
W hen the B ackend Application receives the encrypted A uthentication, it decrypts
it, using the random num ber it generated, as the public key. The backend application then
uses the decrypted A uthentication Code to look up its database and tries to retrieve the
corresponding 64-bit K ey and 128-bit Tag ID values. If the values are not found, the
com m unication is term inated, since a w rong value o f the A uthentication Code deauthenticates the Tag, im plicitly. Otherwise, the corresponding 64-bit K ey and Tag ID
values are retrieved from the database.
4. Tag ID Encryption by Backend Application
Once

the

backend

application

retrieves

the

data,

corresponding

to the

Authentication Code, it encrypts the 128- bit Tag ID, using the same encryption that was
used before. The 128-bit Tag ID is encrypted in two 64-bit blocks. The 64 Least
Significant Bits are encrypted using the 64-bit Authentication Code o f the Tag, as the key
and the 64 M ost Significant Bits are encrypted using the 64-bit K ey o f the Tag, as the
key. The backend application then sends the encrypted Tag ID to the reader which in turn
sends it to the appropriate tag, after setting the operation bits to 01.
5. Tag ID D ecryption by Tag
W hen the Tag receives the encrypted Tag ID, it decrypts it with its 64-bit
Authentication Code and 64-bit Key. The Tag decrypts the encrypted 64-bit block
corresponding to the 64 Least Significant Bits of the Tag ID, using the Authentication
Code as the key and the other encrypted 64-bit block, corresponding to the 64 Most
Significant Bits of the Tag ID, w ith the 64-bit Key o f the Tag. The tag then puts the
decrypted 128-bit tag ID together and com pares it with its own tag ID, in the ROM. If the
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tag IDs match, then the tag has authenticated the reader. If the tag IDs do not match, then
the tag drops the com m unication with that particular reader. The tag checks for an
operation tim eout again, as described before.
6. Tag ED Encryption by Tag
If the R eader had been authenticated, it needs to authenticate the tag too. The tag,
after m atching the tag IDs and authenticating the reader, encrypts the tag ID again, in the
sim ilar way, encrypting it as two 64-bit blocks. B ut this time, the tag encrypts the 64
Least Significant Bits of the Tag ID with its 64-bit K ey and the 64 M ost Significant Bits
o f the Tag ED with the 64-bit Authentication Code. The tag then sends the new encrypted
tag ID to the reader, setting the operation bits to 10.
7. Tag ID D ecryption by Reader
The reader receives the encrypted Tag ED from the tag, to decrypt, w ith the 64-bit
Authentication Code and the 64-bit Key o f the tag. If the reader did not receive the
encrypted tag ID over a specified period o f tim e (250 nanoseconds) the operation times
out. W hen the reader receives the encrypted tag ID, it verifies the tag that sent it, and
passes on the encrypted tag ID to the backend application. The backend application
decrypts the block corresponding the 64 Least Significant Bits of the tag ID with the 64bit Key and the block corresponding to the 64 M ost Significant Bits of the tag ID with the
64-bit A uthentication Code. If the decrypted tag ED matches the one that was retrieved
from the database, the tag is a valid one. The tag is, thus, authenticated. If the tag IDs do
not match, then the operation fails and the reader breaks its com m unication with the
corresponding tag.
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8. Random K ey Generation
Once the tag and the reader are authenticated, the backend application makes the
system m ore secure by changing the public keys that w ere used for encryption. In doing
this, the backend application generated two 64-bit random numbers, one for the
authentication code and one for the tag ’s key. The backend application then updates the
value o f these two for that particular tag ID, in the database and sends these two 64-bit
data to the reader which in turn sends it to the tag, after setting the operation bits to 11.
The tag waits for the data from the reader and if it does not receive it within the specified
time, then it closes the com m unication. Since the reader and the tag have already been
authenticated, the com m unication is ideally complete. W hen the tag receives the
random ly generated 64-bit A uthentic Code and the 64-bit Key, it rewrites its
A uthentication Code and Key, with the new values and sends an acknowledgement signal
back to the reader, which could be the same random ly generated data that the reader sent
it.
The final part of the protocol, w here random keys are generated for the next round
of com m unication, keeps the system highly secure because even if the keys were
com prom ised, an attacker can never use it to fake the reader or the tag because the keys
are periodically changed and are know n ju st to the reader and the tag.
This protocol is sim ilar to the Challenge-response m echanism described in [16,
17] but is m ore robust. The protocol m entioned in [16, 17] authenticates ju st the tag and
does not let the tag authenticate the reader and is vulnerable to various attacks.
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CH A PTER 4

RFID SECU RITY PRO TO CO L SIM ULATOR
In order to observe and analyze the performance m easures o f the proposed
security protocol and to model its functional parameters, a software program was coded,
as a part of the research. It is an effort to aid the analysis of various RFID system
configurations under the dem ands o f specific RFID applications, that im plem ent the
security m echanism describes in this thesis. Although the sim ulator was running on a
high-end com puter system with 3.06GH z Pentium processor with 1GB RAM , it was
coded to consider the factors of a real-tim e RFID system that operates based on specified
RFID and air-interface standards, which are described by ISO/EEC 14443A/B, ISO/EEC
15693, ISO 18000, EN 300 400 Class 2 (Europe) and FCC CFR47 Part 15 (US).
This chapter describes the functions available in the sim ulator and flexibility it
provides in testing the proposed protocol. The simulator software was built on Java
platform w ith a front end in Java Swing. The m inim um requirements for the sim ulator
software to run are a com puter system w ith optim um configuration (300M z Processor
with 128MB RAM ) that is running on W indows, UNIX or Linux, Java Runtime
Environm ent installed in the com puter preferably with J2SDE 1.4.2.
The sim ulator software is opened by double-clicking the executable file, that
contains the generated class files o f the source code.
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4. 1 Sim ulator’s M ain W indow
The following figure shows the main application frame that opens up, as soon as
the sim ulator softw are is opened:

W lU m Slm ulatar

W"'""

aoxMii» E»ii

Close All

ExH

Figure 16 Sim ulator Softw are’s m ain w indow

The Sim ulator Application looks like any other window application with similar
look-and-feel and is easy to navigate. It has a M enu bar that has got W indow, M ode,
Simulation, Results and Exit menu options.
W indow menu has four menu items, nam ely. Sim ulator which opens up the
simulation run window. Close which closes the active window. Close All which closes all
the open windows and E xit which term inates the sim ulator application.
The M ode m enu again has four menu items, out which only one can be chosen,
that decides the m ode in which the user wants the sim ulator to run. Real-tim e mode
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makes the sim ulator run like in a real-tim e situation, Process m ode pauses the simulation
run after every process in the simulation and waits till the user wants to continue. Delay
mode runs the simulation with a delay betw een every two processes in the run and
Compare m ode runs the sim ulator with the same set o f simulation data but using all three
different encryption methods and draws a com parison.
The Simulation menu has two sim ulation m enu items. Run which opens up the
sim ulator autom atically and starts the sim ulation process according to the current system
configuration that is chosen and Options w hich opens an options w indow , which helps
the user to configure the RFID system and set its parameters.
The Results M enu again has tw o m enu item s. View Results opens the View
Results w indow and Export Results exports the simulation run inform ation to a custom
text editor w here it can be viewed, saved or printed. The Exit m enu term inated the
simulator application.
The following figure shows the hierarchical menu structure o f the simulator
software:
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O los^

All
K esui-tim o
O e la y
O

Si£3t*3fcUEleati. o Ml
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■O
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t i o

a j r e

r i s

V i&vi7 R ^ 8 T_i11s
EZ.'scF^or't R é s u l t é

Figure 17 H ierarchical M enu structure
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4.2 Sim ulator W indow
The following figure shows the sim ulator window when it is opened, to run the
simulation.

RFIDSknuWor
Window

iMode gtoiniiatloo Insults

Rxlt

a

Tag 10
Key

Auttmnticalion Code

Cncrypled Tag ID (MSU Key, LSD-Random Code)
Encrypted Tag ID (MSD Random Code, LSD-Key)
Encryirted Aiilh. Code

D e c r e e d Tag ID (MSB Kr^. LSB-Ramlom Code)
Deciyirtori Tag If) (MSB-Random Code, LSH-Key)
; Decrypted Autli. Code

Figure 18 Sim ulator W indow

The sim ulator window has a text area where the details of the simulation run are
updated, even as the sim ulation is running. It also has fields that display the T ag’s data,
after the encryption process and also after decryption. The simulation is started by
clicking on the Run button at the bottom . The Options and View Results button open the
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respective windows and Close button closes this window. The N ext button is used in
Process mode.

4.3 Options W indow
The system configuration can be set using the options window, before running the
simulation. Clicking the Options button opens the Options window.

S in u ta lio a P fo g re ss ^fo rm a lio n

W Options
Encryption Type

Moile

#'Ôoobànp«M|i

® ReaFTlme

OTEA

C Ptocew
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OAES

C ’ Compare
Fretiuency Range

Frequency Moilt

• Low Frequency
S tatus Box

I # Unrnmlulateo

High Frequency

P f/D Ta§ Ù ata

Moilulateil

URra-Hloh Frequency

TagB

( j Microwave

Key
Save

Cancel

EncrypteU Tag ID (MSB-Key, LSB Random Code)
Enciyiited Tag ID (MSB Random Code, LSB-Key)
Encrypted Auth. Code

Df> crypM R W Taÿ Data

Deciypted Tag ID (MSB-Key, LSB Random Code)
Decrypted Tag ID (MSB-Random Code, LSB-K^)
Decrvtited Airth. Code

Close

Figure 19 Options window of the Sim ulator
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The following figure shows the sim ulator window, after a sim ulation run, with the
default configuration (Boolean Encryption Type; Real-tim e mode; Low frequency range;
Unm odulated frequency):
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Figure 20 Sim ulator w indow after a simulation run

W hen running in the process mode, the sim ulator window freezes letting the user
hit only the next button. The user may choose to stop to view the sim ulation process after
every single step and the simulation does not proceed until the user clicks on the Next
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button. This m ode is for a better understanding o f the protocol. The following figure
shows the sim ulator w indow running in Process mode:
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Figure 21 Sim ulator window when running in Process mode

Once the sim ulation run is completed, the View Results button can be clicked to
view the results of the simulation. It opens a View Results window which gives the
options of exporting the sim ulation data and to view the encryption tim e details as a pie
chart. W hen the Export Results option is chosen, the simulation data are exported to a
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custom text editor, where the data can be m anipulated, saved as a text file or printed. If
the Chart option is chosen, the tim e needed for encryption/ decryption at various stages of
the simulation run are displayed, as a Pie Chart, in nanoseconds.

4.4 View Results W indow
The following figures show the View R esult window, the exported results and the
pie chart with the results of the sim ulation run;
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Figure 22 V iew Results window of the Sim ulator
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Figure 23 Sim ulation Results exported to a custom text editor
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Figure 24 Pie-chart of tim e needed for encryption/decryption in sim ulation run

This Sim ulator is based only on the protocol proposed in this thesis and cannot be
used for a general RFID system, although the code can be m odified to m ake it a general
RFID simulator.
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CHAPTER 5

SECU RITY PRO TO C O L ANALYSIS
RFID Applications are probably the m ost pervasive technologies, but can be
exposed to new threats on security and privacy. A typical RFID Application is a really
simple system, in terms o f the com m unication between its entities. W ireless exchange of
data between low -pow er devices makes an RFID system, highly vulnerable to a wide
range of attacks.
[39]

discusses in detail, the different types o f attacks that are possible on low cost

Identification devices. The basic possible attacks on an RFID system are listed below
[40]:
Eavesdropping
M an-in-the-m iddle
Replay attack
Data Loss (DoS, M essage hijacking)
Forgery (D ecoy Tag, etc.)
Physical attack
The restrictions on the resources o f an RFID system, rule out the possibility of a
com plex and fool-proof security protocol. The security im plem entation is always a trade
off between how secure the application is required to be, and an efficient light-w eight
security protocol. The eventual choice depends on the consequences of a com prom ised
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system and on how much data loss is acceptable. A simple protocol that secures the
application, from the above-m entioned attacks, in the m ost efficient way possible, with
minimal utilization o f resources, is the call of the day.
5.1 Security A nalysis against Attacks
The security protocol that is proposed here, tries to resist any attack effectively, as
discussed below:
5.1.1 Eavesdropping
An Eavesdropping attack, as the nam e suggests, is tapping data that is transm itted
between tw o legitim ate objects, w ithout their know ledge and w ithout any m odification to
the data [41]. In case o f an RFID system, it refers to an adversary, intercepting the data
that is being transm itted between either the Tag and the Reader or the Reader and the
backend application, w ithout altering it. The data transm ission between the Reader and
the backend application is quite generic and can use any protocol, like TCP/IP, SOAP,
SSL/TLS, etc. or can use a M iddleware that controls the data transm ission using one or
more of these protocols, im plem ented with a high level o f security, according to the
application in question [42]. Since, there is a lot o f research already being done, on the
security aspects of data transm ission between the R eader and the backend application,
and since the security protocol proposed in this dissertation deals with the authentication
of the RFID T ag and the Reader, it is not im perative, to study the m iddlew are security
aspects. The attack on the com m unication betw een the R eader and the Tag is of more
relevance, here.
The fact that the Tag and the R eader com m unicate using R F waves, in a wireless
medium, m akes Eavesdropping an im m inent possibility. A single antenna that is within
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the range of the RFID system, is sufficient to receive the R F signals that are being
transm itted, and decoded later [43]. It is practically im possible to stop any other RF
receiver from receiving the R F signals and hence the proposed protocol tries to overcome
this by transm itting dum m y data, along w ith the original data so that even if the attacker,
or Eavesdropper, intercepts the data, it w ould not make much sense to him.
The transm ission protocol uses Frequency Division M ultiplexing, along with
Frequency Hopping. The frequency range that the RFID devices operate in is divided into
bands and data is transm itted through all the bands synchronously. Frequency Division
M ultiplexing is the traditional access m ethod for Radio signal transm ission. The RFID
device transm its the required data through one o f the frequency bands and dumm y data
through the rest of the bands. The security im plem entation o f the RF application is such
that, the frequency at which the legitim ate data is sent, keeps changing for every
transmission. This type of access. Frequency H opping - Code Division M ultiple Access
(FH-CDM A), is used to m inim ize the effectiveness of unauthorized interception or
jam m ing of com m unication [29]. This type of access m ethod does not eliminate
Eavesdropping but reduces the possibility of the attack by more than 90%. Thus, even if
the transm itted data was intercepted, the eavesdropper would not know if it is the original
data and with the frequency hops changing with a Spread function [29], it can be harder
to validate any data that m ight be even intercepted.
5.1.2 M an-In-The-M iddle
A M an-In-The-M iddle attack (M ITM ) is an attack in which an attacker is able to
read, insert and m odify at will, m essages between two parties w ithout either party
knowing that the link between them has been com prom ised [44]. This type o f attack.

49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

against an RFID system would mean an attacker being able to intercept and modify data
that is being exchanged between either the R eader and the Tag or the Reader and the
B ackend application. Again, we choose to ignore the security aspects of com munication
between the R eader and the Backend application.
An M ITM attack on the com m unication between the Tag and the Reader is
probably the m ost adverse attack and is capable of having the whole system
com prom ised. Eavesdropping, discussed above, is a special case of the M ITM attack in
which the data is intercepted but not modified.
Assum ing the attacker intercepts the legitim ate data, the security im plem entation
should m ake sure the data is encrypted so as to make it as obscure as possible. Encrypting
the data before transm itting it reduces the loss by a big margin, but how ever, as discussed
earlier, the type o f encryption is always a trade-off and depends on the type o f encryption
the R F application can afford. The proposed security protocol recom m ends the use of an
encryption algorithm that uses a key, w hich is changed after every successful readresponse between the Tag and the Reader. It should be noted that, encryption and
decryption are practically im possible when using passive RFID Tags, tags which don’t
have a pow er source o f their own.
The proposed protocol secures the physical layer of com m unication by using
Frequency Hopping. W ith frequency hopping, only the valid tag and the reader know
which frequency is being used for legitim ate communication, with the rest carrying
useless data. For a M an-in-the-m iddle, figuring the frequency hop sequence is im possible
as it is random ly generated, and hence even though intercepting data is possible in an
RFID system, the M an-in-the-m iddle attack is proven to be not so effective.
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5.1.3 Replay Attack
A replay attack is a form of netw ork attack in which a valid data transm ission is
m aliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is carried out either by the
originator or by an adversary w ho intercepts the data and retransm its it, possibly as part
o f a masquerade attack by IP packet substitution (such as stream cipher attack) [45]. The
various methods of preventing replay attacks are discussed in [46, 47, 49], which include
session timeouts, tim estam ping, statistical analysis, etc.
A Replay attack on an RFID system would mean an attacker intercepting data that
is transm itted between the tag and the reader, and repeating or delaying it. In a replay
attack, an adversary broadcasts an exact replay of the transponder end of the radio signal
recorded from a past transaction between an RF device and a reader. W here mechanisms
exist to foil simple replays (such as time stamps, one-tim e passwords, and challengeresponse cryptography) a related but more sophisticated attack can frequently still
succeed. This attack, com m only known as the relay attack, uses a man in the middle
adversary to relay an ephem eral connection from a legitim ate reader through one or more
adversarial devices to a legitim ate tag which m ay be at a considerable distance. The
distance at which the relay attack can succeed is lim ited only by the latency which will be
tolerated by the attacked protocol [49]. A ccording to [50], a simple security protocol
based on Sem i-Random ized A ccess Control (SRAC) is efficient enough in securing a
low-cost RFID system from replay and m an-in-the-m iddle attacks.
The proposed protocol does not define any m easures to tackle a replay attack in
particular, but its current im plem entation is im pregnable against it and also relay attacks.
The security protocol conceals the legitimate data by transm itting in m ore than one
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channel and even if the frequency hop sequence is cracked, the data is encrypted using
keys that keep changing, which would m ake very little sense to the attacker. Since, this
im plem entation averts a replay attack by itself, any specific prevention techniques like
timestamps, session tim eouts, etc. will ju st be an overhead on an RFID system. If needed,
stronger m easures to prevent replay attacks could be im plem ented at the cost of a more
complex system.
5.1.4 D ata Loss/D enial of Service
A denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) is an attempt to make a com puter resource
unavailable to its intended users. A DoS attack can either force the victim to reset or
consum e its resources such that it can no longer provide its intended service or obstruct
the com m unication m edia between the intended users and the victim so that they can no
longer com m unicate adequately [51].
D enial-of-service denies service to valid users. D enial-of-service attacks are easy
to accomplish and difficult to guard against. W e are unaware of any protocol-level
technique for circum venting the effects of a m alicious blocker tag, but explore simple
ways o f detecting the presence o f such a device. An attacker kills tags in the supply
chain, warehouse, or store disrupting business operations and causing a loss o f revenue.
Some tags have a “kill” com m and to destroy it to protect consum er privacy. If
im plem ented in the tag, an attacker can “kill” the tag if the password is known. An
attacker can also sim ulate m any RFID tags sim ultaneously causing the anti-collision to
perform singulation on a large num ber o f tags m aking the system unavailable to
authorized use. An attacker can also use a powerful jam m er that jam s the reader by
creating a m ore powerful return signal than the signal returned from the tags and thus
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m aking the system unavailable to authorized users or could use a Faraday’s Cage [52,
53].
The proposed protocol does not im plem ent a “kill” com m and but keeps changing
the public key used for encryption after every read-response cycle. H ow ever, it does not
protect the system against D enial o f Service by signal jam m ing. The system can be scaled
to incorporate specific security against these sorts of attacks. If the data is made
unavailable or if it’s delayed, the proposed protocol has a tim eout function, which is
going to tim eout the operation and the whole data exchange is dropped. The reader is
going to send a new request at a different frequency which m ight not be jam m ed. If the
whole frequency range is jam m ed or if there is any physical factor that causes the loss of
data, the protocol does not provide any means of security and has to be troubleshooted
manually.
5.1.5 Forgery
Forgery refers to an adversary duplicating a valid tag or a reader to fake a
legitim ate transaction and steal data. The proposed protocol never lets an intruder get the
details of a tag from the reader or from the tag. But if it’s com prom ised, the possibility of
spoofing the tag is quite imminent. For the attacker to even duplicate, he needs to gather
inform ation about the system, like the frequency range, frequency hop sequence, or the
tag ID, A uthentication Code, etc.
5.1.6 Physical Attacks
Physical attacks are pretty straightforward and could be anything that could make
the tag or the reader dysfunctional. The security protocol does not handle physical
attacks. The RFID system needs to be physically secured from the proxim ity of any other
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electrom agnetic field or an attacker who has easy access to the hardw are o f the RFID
system setup.
The proposed protocol seems to w ork pretty fine against m ost of the attacks
m entioned above. It is also proven to resist the STRID E model of security threats for an
RFID system. To test the protocol, a Sim ulator was coded in Java, and the sim ulation runs
are used to corroborate the fact that this security protocol is pretty strong and rugged.

5.2 Encryption Im plem entation Analysis
The proposed Security protocol was tested with three different encryption
methods. Boolean Encryption, Tiny Encryption A lgorithm and A dvanced Encryption
Standard. Each o f these encryption methods differ in the com plexity of the algorithm , in
terms of tim e and resources. Since the efficiency o f these algorithms are already known,
the question is about how well these algorithms w ould fit in an RFID system and enhance
its performace. The m em ory resource utilized could not be com puted w hen using a
sim ulator but their perform ance was m eansured in term s of time needed for encryption
and decryption, when used in an RFID system. The following tables show the time
needed for encryption and decryption, for each o f these algorithms, over 10 runs, when
run with the Simulator.
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5.2.1 Boolean (XOR) Encryption/ Decryption
Simulatio

Auth

Tag ID LSB-

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID MSB-

Average

n Run

Code

Random

MSB-Key

LSB-Key

Auth Code

Encryption

Encrypti

number

Encryption

Encrypti

Encryption

Time (nS)

on Time

Encryption

Time (nS)

on Time

Time (nS)

(nS)

Time (nS)

1

5

3

0

3

3

2.8

2

5

4

0

3

3

3.0

3

5

4

0

3

3

3.0

4

4

4

0

3

3

2.8

5

5

4

0

3

3

3.0

6

5

3

0

3

3

2.8

7

4

3

0

3

3

2 .6

8

5

4

0

3

3

3.0

9

4

4

0

3

3

2.8

10

5

4

0

3

4

3.2

(nS)

Table 2 Boolean XOR Encryption

The encryption time in nanoseconds for different encryptions in the protocol over
10 sim ulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average encryption time over 10
runs is 2.9 nanoseconds.
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Simulatio

Auth Code

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Average

n Run

Decryption

LSB-

MSB-Key

LSB-Key

MSB-Auth

Decryption

Time (nS)

Random

Decryption

Decryption

Code

Time (nS)

number

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

Decryption
Time (nS)

Decryption
Time (nS)

1

3

3

3

3

4

3.2

2

3

3

3

3

3

3.0

3

4

3

3

3

3

3.2

4

3

3

3

3

3

3.0

5

4

3

4

3

3

3.4

6

3

3

3

3

3

3.0

7

3

3

3

3

3

3.0

8

4

3

4

3

3

3.4

9

4

3

3

3

3

3.2

10

4

3

3

3

3

3.2

Table 3 Boolean X O R Decryption

The decryption tim e in nanoseconds for different decryptions in the protocol over
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average decryption tim e over 10
runs is 3.16 nanoseconds.
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5.2.2 TEA Encryption/ Decryption
Simulatio

Auth

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID MSB-

Average

n Run

Code

LSB-

MSB-Key

LSB-Key

Auth Code

Encryption

Encrypti

Random

Encryption

Encryption

Encryption

Time (nS)

on Time

number

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

(nS)

Encryption
Time (nS)

1

1193

1152

1096

1201

1155

1159.4

2

1205

1183

1175

1192

1176

1186.2

3

1187

1164

1188

1186

1159

1176.8

4

1196

1158

1179

1164

1168

1173

5

1163

1181

1143

1159

1177

1164.6

6

1145

1201

1152

1160

1153

1162.2

7

1142

1175

1144

1161

1164

1157.2

8

1211

1167

1169

1173

1163

1176.6

9

1189

1159

1163

1145

1172

1165.6

10

1181

1163

1181

1179

1187

1178.2

Table 4 Tiny Encryption A lgorithm Encryption

The encryption time in nanoseconds for different encryptions in the protocol over
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average encryption tim e over 10
runs is 1169.98 nanoseconds.

57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Simulatio

Auth Code

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Average

n Run

Decryption

LSB-

MSB-Key

LSB-Key

MSB-Auth

Decryption

Time (nS)

Random

Decryption

Decryption

Code

Time (nS)

number

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

Decryption

Decryption

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

1

1184

1148

1138

1144

1147

1152.2

2

1198

1179

1174

1177

1181

1181.8

3

1173

1231

1178

1195

1195

1194.4

4

1207

1152

1155

1167

1153

1166.8

5

1154

1175

1184

1163

1202

1175.6

6

1133

1172

1192

1181

1177

1171

7

1124

1176

1190

1182

1213

1177

8

1200

1200

1184

1175

1186

1189

9

1125

1185

1194

1131

1156

1158.2

10

1174

1175

1168

1164

1167

1169.6

Table 5 Tiny Encryption A lgorithm Decryption

The decryption time in nanoseconds for different decryptions in the protocol over
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average decryption tim e over 10
runs is 1173.56 nanoseconds.
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5.2.3 AES Encryption/ Decryption
Simulati

Auth Code

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Average

on Run

Encryption

LSB-

MSB-Key

LSB-Key

MSB-Auth

Encryption

Time (nS)

Random

Encryption

Encryption

Code

Time (nS)

number

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

Encryption
Time (nS)

Encryption
Time (nS)

1

3341

5153

3152

3054

3576

3655.2

2

4347

5651

4308

4209

2482

4199.4

3

4731

3497

3211

3199

3415

3610.6

4

3204

2948

2666

3225

4180

3244.6

5

5977

3016

2387

2374

2376

3226

6

4170

4246

3708

3587

3470

3836.2

7

2794

2559

2393

2656

3140

2708.4

8

4574

3108

4196

4963

3472

4062.6

9

3531

3884

3043

4341

2633

3486.4

10

3290

3073

3053

4146

3034

3319.2

Table 6 A dvanced Encryption Standard Encryption

The encryption tim e in nanoseconds for different encryptions in the protocol over
10 simulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average encryption tim e over 10
runs is 3534.86 nanoseconds.
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Simulati

Auth Code

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Tag ID

Average

on Run

Decryption

LSB-

MSB-Key

LSB-Key

MSB-Auth

Decryption

Time (nS)

Random

Decryption

Decryption

Code

Time (nS)

number

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

Decryption

Decryption

Time (nS)

Time (nS)

1

3054

2894

2934

4115

3154

3230.2

2

2817

2763

2739

4963

4009

3458.2

3

3229

3018

3090

4923

3066

3465.2

4

2762

2409

2414

3621

2429

2727

5

2433

2229

2318

2310

2244

2306.8

6

3257

3275

. 2852

3571

3162

3223.4

7

2267

2134

2223

2129

2694

2289.4

8

3085

2987

3016

2981

3627

3139.2

9

3297

2970

2912

4205

4069

3490.6

10

4103

3053

2946

3034

2942

3215.6

Table 7 Advanced Encryption Standard D ecryption

The decryption tim e in nanoseconds for different decryptions in the protocol over
10 sim ulation runs is tabulated as shown above. The average decryption time over 10
runs is 3054.56 nanoseconds.
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The following diagram shows the graph of both the average encryption tim e and
the average decryption tim e, for the three encryption types, over 10 simulation runs:
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Figure 25 Simulation R un plotted against the A verage Encryption Tim e for the 3
encryption types
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Figure 26 Sim ulation R un plotted against the A verage D ecryption Tim e for the 3
encryption types
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C H APTER 6

CO N CLU SIO N AND FUTURE W O RK
In the course of this thesis, it was observed that the proposed security protocol can
secure an RFID system from the m ost sophisticated attacks. It can be im plem ented in any
active RFID system but has to be m odified in order to be im plem ented in an RFID system
with passive tags. Tiny Encryption A lgorithm s seems to suit the RFID application better
than any other encryption algorithm , as m entioned in [17]. Overall, the proposed protocol
scores over the existing ones with a simple authentication procedure and a robust
encryption and secure m edium access, im plem ented in a typical RFID system.
W ith the rapid growth o f RFID each day, the proposed protocol will find
extensive use in future because w ith w ider deploym ent of m ore com plex applications, the
effective cost of this protocol w hich m ight seem a little expensive for a light-weight
RFID system, will go down. This protocol can also be tested with different types of
encryption to protect data and ensure privacy. The type of encryption is a trade-off and
can be chosen according to the application that uses RFID. H ence, this protocol can be
substituted with any other encryption that is feasible for RFID operation and can also be
m odified to save power and m em ory resources, though at the cost of some security
com prom ised.
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